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The evolution of the concept of “accident”
In the introduction to the book “Just Culture”, Sidney Dekker1 explains how the term “accident” is a
relatively modern concept. He describes how, up until the scientific revolution of the 17th century, people
believed that misfortune was underpinned by religious or superstitious influences, and that humans were
powerless to intervene. By the 20th century, this view hadmatured, tending to see accidents as “meaningless
coincidences of space and time”, somewhat less judgemental than the religious view, but equally
unhelpfully, human intervention was seen as impossible. A modern view sees accidents simply as failures
to effectively manage risk. Safety scientists view accidents as entirely normal properties of complex
sociotechnical systems.2 It is from such a systems perspective that the authors consider the impact the
current pharmacy legislative framework may have on patient safety, a key target of all healthcare
organisations in the light of the recognition that healthcare-induced injury is one of the leading causes of
death worldwide.3
Healthcare: A system of (complex sociotechnical) systems
A system can be defined as a set of interrelated (coupled) entities united in a joint purpose.4 Entities include
physical objects, technology, processes and relationships, as well as organisational constraints and indeed
the legal and regulatory framework that underpins professional behaviour.When entities are tightly linked
and inter-dependent (a relationship known as “coupling”) changes can cascade rapidly through the system,
causing a ripple effect that may only be felt at a distance from the point of change. Systems can be small
(micro; perhaps a worker using a tool or technology), medium (meso; a healthcare example might be a
surgical team) or large (macro; perhaps a hospital, or indeed the NHS as a whole5). Larger systems (certainly
those seen in healthcare) tend to be sociotechnical in nature, reflecting the fact that a key feature of the
system is the people within it (and their relationships with other entities, which increasingly include
technological elements). It can also be appreciated that such large systems subsume many meso- and
micro-systems, and the relationships between these need to be considered. In such complex systems, there
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are so many interactions between entities, with relationships often tightly coupled, that outcomes can be
difficult to predict, a concept known as emergence. Safety is one such emergent property, making safety
management highly complex.
Given the relationship between system performance and safety, the authors define safety (including
patient safety) using this systems language: “[Safety is] the level of system performance required to keep
the incidence of harm (and risk) as low as reasonably practicable.” There are obvious issues (particularly
from a legal perspective) with this definition, particularly in relation to defining an acceptably low level
of risk. However, in terms of proactively improving patient safety, this is a far more usable definition than
that those most commonly used in healthcare. While the term “safety” is frequently used in healthcare, it
is infrequently defined, and where definitions exist, there is a lack of standardisation, which causes
confusion. A common feature of such definitions is “prevention of medical error”. This is problematic in
two ways, first, because prevention of error is unachievable in complex sociotechnical systems, and
focussing on error prevention inhibits resources from being used more effectively to develop resilient
systems that can accommodate this inevitable error without compromising safety. Secondly, identifying
error allocates blame, meaning that individual system “actors” bear the brunt of responsibility for adverse
outcomes which are inevitably systems issues, with multiple interacting contributory factors. Increasingly
often in healthcare, attribution of blame has attracted civil and indeed criminal proceedings, and the authors
would contend that this trend of criminalising errors actively undermines the opportunity for genuine
improvement of patient safety.
Just Culture and the “high reliability” dream
Functioning of complex sociotechnical systems needs effective safety management,6 and this requires
hazard identification, accurate risk estimation and active control measures. Reason7 believes this is best
supported by cultures which are: (i) open to reporting; (ii) just; and (iii) promote learning (and using this
learning to visibly improve safety performance8). The safety performance pinnacle is considered to be the
“high reliability organisation” (“HRO”).9 Weick and Sutcliffe10 describe HRO characteristics as follows:
• Such organisations are pre-occupied with failure, constantly searching for small signals that
may predict failure. They gather, analyse and review this data, linking it to outcomes, and
establish critical monitoring measures for their own operational context.
• They reward open reporting, and use the date they collect to proactively manage future risk.
• They show reluctance to simplify interpretation of their data, socialising workers at all levels
of the organisation to be curious about safety.
• HROs are sensitive to operations, meaning staff have good situational awareness.
• HROs are resilient. Errors occur, but are not disabling, and such organisations achieve this
because they take a systems approach to safety management.
Interestingly, despite the risks involved (and the financial and personal costs associated with medical
injury), healthcare organisations have not traditionally viewed themselves as HROs, and although there
have been suggestions that adopting HRO frameworks might usefully support enhanced patient safety,
6 S. Wilke, A. Majumdar and W.Y. Ochieng, “Airport surface operations: a holistic framework for operations modelling and risk management”
[2014] Safety Science 63: 18–33.
7 J. Reason,Managing the risk of organisational accidents (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997).
8C. Burns, K. Mearns and P. McGeorge, “Explicit and implicit trust within safety culture” [2006] Risk Analysis 26(5): 1139–1150.
9A. Hopkins, “The problem of defining higher reliability organisations” 2017Working Paper 51; National Research Centre for OHS Regulation at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.461.7777&rep=rep1&type=pdf [Accessed 17 January 2018]; J. C. Le Coze, “Viva la
diversité! High reliability organisation (HRO) and resilience engineering (RE)” [2016] Safety Science at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.04.006
[accessed 17 January 2018].
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there are significant barriers to achieving this. Perhaps the greatest of these is the absence of truly Just
Culture, which is dependent upon open reporting.
Just culture
Leape11 asserted “the greatest impediment to error prevention is… punish[ing] people for makingmistakes”
calling for non-punitive cultures. However, this fails to acknowledge some errors warrant individual
accountability.12Just Culture recognises this, representing “a collective understanding of where the line is
drawn between blameless and blameworthy actions”. It reflects the systems thinking described above,
recognising error is also an emergent property, but including room for individual accountability.13 It is
important to be clear that Just Culture does not mean no blame but rather fair blame. There is plenty of
evidence in the medical literature to indicate that not all medical injury is the result of “normal accidents”
of healthcare delivery, including significant UK cases, such as Harold Shipman14 and Beverly Allitt.15 This
seems relatively straightforward and desirable, but the problems lie in implementation. “Drawing the line”
is highly subjective, biased by the role of the decision-maker and, in healthcare, by medical hierarchy.16
Delivering Just Culture is as complex as the system it serves.
The complexity of Just Culture resides in the flawed assumption that there is one “true story” in the
narrative of an adverse event. The term “Just Culture” (note the upper case) is often used as shorthand to
describe the structures in place within an organisation designed to deliver just culture. Such structures
often include decision-making tools such as the “decision tree” used by the UK NHS.17 This comprises
four tests:
• Deliberate harm test:
Was there “a conscious and deliberate breach of duty” and did this breach result in patient
harm?
• Physical and mental health test:
Was there any underlying health condition, and did this impact care in anyway? If yes, the
contribution of this to the “harm” must be established.
• Foresight test:
Were standard operating procedures/policies followed? Could the effects of any such violation
have been reasonably predicted?
• Substitution test:
Would a similarly qualified/experienced practitioner in the same circumstances have followed
a similar course of action?
11L. L. Leape, “Errors in medicine” [2009] Clinica Chimica Acta 404(1): 2–5.
12 S. Petschonek, J. Burlison, C. Cross, K. Martin, J. Laver, R. S. Landis and J. M. Hoffman, “Development of the Just Culture Assessment Tool
(JCAT): measuring the perceptions of healthcare professionals in hospitals” [2013] Journal of Patient Safety 9(4): 190–197; S. Dekker and T. B. Hugh,
“A just culture after Mid Staffordshire” [2014] BMJ Quality & Safety 23: 356–358.
13C. Burns, K. Mearns and P. McGeorge, “Explicit and implicit trust within safety culture” [2006] Risk Analysis 26(5): 1139–1150; R. M. Wachter
and P. J. Provonost, “Balancing ‘no blame’ with accountability in patient safety” [2009] New England Journal of Medicine 31(14): 1401–1406.
14 J. Smith, “The Shipman Enquiry. The final report” (2005) at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090808160144/http://www.the-shipman
-inquiry.org.uk/finalreport.asp [accessed 17 January 2018].
15Department of Health, The Allitt Inquiry (Clothier Report) (Stationery Office Books, 1994).
16 S. Dekker, Just culture: balancing safety and accountability 2nd edn (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012); B. J. Weiner, C. Hobgood and M. A. Lewis,
“The meaning of justice in safety incident reporting” [2008] Social Science and Medicine 66: 403–413; T. von Thaden, M. Hoppes, Y. Li, N. Johnson
and A. Schriver, “The perception of just culture across disciplines in healthcare” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th
Annual Meeting 2006; San Francisco, HFES.
17 P. G. Boysen, “Just culture: a foundation for balanced accountability and patient safety” [2013] Oschner Journal 13(3): 400–406.
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The problem is that each of these tests requires someone to make a judgement call, and such a
“judgement” is simply a social construction, no more than somebody’s attribution. Here there are many
similarities with the legal system: this “somebody” has both the power to decide what category an act falls
into, and also to attach sanctions, sanctions which may have severe impact for the person being judged.
The reason that there is not one “true story” of any event is that all those involved have a different
perspective and understanding of the event. Rasmussen18 captured this problem eloquently:
“If we find ourselves asking ‘how could they have been so negligent, so reckless, so irresponsible?’,
then this is not because the people in question were behaving bizarrely, it is because we have chosen
the wrong frame of reference for understanding their behaviour.”
This quote also succinctly captures the essence of truly just cultures: the idea is not to judge individuals
for apparent safety failings, but to try and understand the context, what it was about the working
environment that made it seem reasonable to those involved to undertake the course of action they selected.
If it made sense to this worker, then it is likely to make sense to others working under similar conditions.
Often the person empowered with “drawing the line” has no understanding of the pressures under which
the work was being carried out, what Dekker15 refers to as the “messy, conflicted details of [the worker’s]
responsibilities”. There are numerous potential flaws in all of the above tests, but there are three that are
particularly worthy of highlighting. The first of these is hindsight bias. There is a wealth of evidence in
the literature to indicate that the outcome significantly influences the opinion of those judging others’
behaviour. The more serious the outcome, the more likely it is that the behaviour will be judged in a
negative light. This makes the substitution test unreliable. Secondly, it is highly likely that the foresight
test will reveal deviations and even violations of policies and procedures, and these are often then considered
to be the root cause of the incident. This notion that following standard operating procedures leads to good
outcomes, while deviations and violations underpin poor outcomes is simply not true. In recent years,
there has been a shift, often referred to as a move from Safety I to Safety II.19 Safety I involves analysis
of comparatively rare adverse events. Safety II turns this around, acknowledging that most of the time
healthcare outcomes are good. By exploring normal work in this way, the factors that underpin success
can be identified. These sorts of studies reveal that procedural deviations and violations are part of normal
work, and often reflect the adjustments that staff need to make on a day-to-day basis to deliver successful
outcomes. This allows the weak points in the system to be identified, facilitating intelligent system
re-design. The third issue is that patient harm is not necessarily a good marker of the safety status of a
system. There can be endemic weaknesses in a healthcare system that sometimes lead to patient harm.
All of these factors make achieving Just Culture very difficult, and innocent mistakes can be “constructed”
to appear as negligent or wilful acts. How effectively Just Culture operates within an organisation is
influenced by a combination of the legal and regulatory framework governing professional behaviour and
the expectations of society and both of these can be particularly negative with respect to healthcare,
particularly in relation to pharmacy practice.
Pharmacy regulatory framework
In general, healthcare “wrongs” are dealt with (in the UK) under a tort system, so civil liability rather than
criminal liability. Legal action through this route may be pursued for a number of reasons, but one important
aspect is that assigning blame (whether to an organisation or an individual) allows the release of financial
compensation. Significantly though, the “zero tolerance” message contained within the Francis Report20
18Cited in S. Dekker, Just culture: balancing safety and accountability, 2nd edn (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).
19 J. Braithwaite, R. L. Wears and E. Hollnagel, “Resilient healthcare: turning patient safety on its head” [2015] International Journal for Quality
in Health Care 1–3 at https://academic.oup.com/intqhc/article/27/5/418/2357417 [accessed 17 January 2018].
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has led to an increasing trend for criminal proceedings, and there have been changes in the legislation to
support this. The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 ss.20–25 set out a framework for a crime of “wilful
neglect of a patient”. This charge can be levied against an individual or a corporate body such as the NHS.
Sanctions can include remedial orders and fines as well as the reputational damage for the organisation.
The increasing penalties for such offences means that an organisationmay feel it is “better” for an individual
to be blamed for an adverse outcome. Even if this is not the case, the new legislation emphasise personal
responsibility and, even in the case of corporate charges, there is a focus on individual liability, of
identifying those considered “most guilty” in the case of extreme poor care.
In addition to the healthcare regulatory framework, there are additional concerns for practising
pharmacists. Currently, the larger part of their work involves the supply of pharmaceutics, involving the
process of dispensing. Dispensing is dealt with under a different regulatory framework: Medicines Act
1968 (partially repealed by the Human Medicines Regulations 201221). Offences against ss.64 and 85 of
this legislation are absolute offences, and due diligence is not considered a defence. Section 85 is concerned
with the packaging and labelling of pharmaceutics, while s.64 concerns the medicinal product being of
the nature or quality demanded by the purchaser. Essentially, this legislation means that an act which is
recognised by all concerned as an innocent error made by an individual pharmacist can still be treated as
a criminal offence. While prosecutions under this Act have been rare, they have occurred and, because
the prosecutions have been a response to patient fatality, the initial charges in some of the cases were
actually gross negligence manslaughter, rather the charges specified within the legislation. On appeal,
these charges were generally reduced to offences against ss.64 and 85. One of the outcomes of these
prosecutions was clarification of s.85. The legislation refers to the offence occurring “in the course of a
business carried on by him”, and this is now interpreted as meaning the retail pharmacy company, not the
individual pharmacist.
The impact of legislation on Just Culture
The outcomes of criminalisation of healthcare errors are drastic. For the individual, these may include
loss of liberty, financial penalties, fear, grief, guilt, depression, loss of job and even suicide. The impact
is enormous, and Dekker refers to these staff as “the second victim” of the adverse event. There is evidence
to indicate that many of the emotional responses are normal in the wake of any adverse event (including
those not prosecuted), and recovery requires peer support which, in the event of a prosecution, is usually
denied to the accused as colleagues are usually required to maintain a distance until after the trial. While
these outcomes are tragic, the effect of prosecution can be even more severe with respect to future patient
safety. The trial itself becomes rather less about “the truth” and more about trying to minimise what Dekker
refers to as “the spiralling negative consequences of a trial”. The events become a powerful driver of
behaviour to all in the organisation or profession. Practice becomes much more defensive, rather than
concentrating on delivering a high quality service, practitioners become much more focussed on limiting
their own personal liability. Furthermore, staff are very unlikely to voluntarily report incidents and
near-misses as they have seen that the behaviour considered to contribute to such performance failings
may be punished.Without open reporting, there are no data on which to build a proactive risk management
strategy.
Two of the high profile cases which resulted in pharmacist prosecutions are testament to this. The cases
of Elizabeth Lee andMartinWhite show alarming similarity. Both “errors” involved selection of propranolol
instead of prednisolone. Contributory factors included:
21Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/1916).
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• shelves in both pharmacies arranged according to the World Health Organisation22
recommendation that “drugs are arranged in alphabetical order of generic names”; and
• packages for both medicines were similar in appearance.
It was acknowledged that both pharmacists had impeccable records and both made errors that “any
competent pharmacist could (and in all probability would) unintentionally make a number of times
throughout their professional career”. Both were punished rather than learning from the cases to (according
to RPS President Martin Astbury23) put “measures in place so that one simple mistake can’t lead to such
devastating harm to patients and their families”. Furthermore, it was suggested that awareness of these
outcomes leads to a fear of the legislation which can be seen to have a significant impact on pharmacist
behaviour.24 Fear of the legislation may lead to pharmacists having reduced confidence in their ability to
take sole responsibility for patient outcomes, which may undermine the enhanced future role envisaged
for pharmacists.
The relationship between Just Culture and human factors/ergonomics:Amechanism
for delivering improved patient safety
Just Culture is largely concerned with achieving the resilience and sensitivity to operations that are such
an important feature of HROs. This supports a proactive risk management strategy. HROs generally
implement such strategies by using a human factors/ergonomics approach. Human Factors is synonymous
with the term “ergonomics”, hence the abbreviation HFE. HFE approaches are useful because they share
three fundamental characteristics. They:
• take a systems approach, as described at the beginning of this paper;
• are design-driven to support good performance and prevent poor outcomes rather than
promoting safety by demanding behavioural modification of the actors within the system,
processes, equipment etc;
• focus on dual outcomes of optimising system performance and improving humanwellbeing.
In the UK, there have been initiatives to introduce HFE since 1990 after a change in legislation in 1986
when Crown Immunity from prosecution under the Health and Safety Act 197425was removed. HFE input
was used in 1980s–2000s for building design,26 occupational health27 and systems approaches to embed
HFE as part of the organisational culture.28
In 2013, a Concordat was signed by 16 health care agencies in England (including professional regulators,
inspection agencies and education providers) stating that “a wider understanding of Human Factors
principles and practices will contribute significantly to improving the quality (effectiveness, experience
and safety) of care for patients”.29 One of the initiatives to implement the Concordat was a series of HFE
taster workshops in collaborationwith the UK professional body for HFE (Chartered Institute of Ergonomics
& Human Factors (“CIEHF”)) to a wide range of NHS staff.
HFE can address many safety issues: it offers validated tools for modelling, re-designing and testing
systems. While some of these require expert professional input, many are usable for less experienced
22 See http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js7919e/7.10.3.html#Js7919e.7.10.3 [accessed 17 January 2018].
23 See https://www.chemistanddruggist.co.uk/news/lawyer-pharmacists-sentencing-shocking-and-wrong [accessed 17 January 2018].
24H. Vosper and S. Hignett, “A review of Human Factors and patient safety education in pharmacy curricula: a UK undergraduate perspective with
lessons for pharmacy education” [2017] American Journal of Pharmacy Education at http://www.ajpe.org/doi/pdf/10.5688/ajpe6184 [accessed 17
January 2018].
25 I. Seccombe, “Sickness Absence and Health at Work in the NHS” [1995] Health Manpower Management 21 (5): 6–11.
26 P. Hilliar, “The DHSS Ergonomics Data Bank and the Design of Spaces in Hospitals” [1981] Applied Ergonomics 12 (4): 209–216.
27L. M. Straker, “Work-Associated Back Problems: Collaborative Solutions” [1990] Occupational Medicine 40: 75–79.
28 S. Hignett, “Embedding Ergonomics in Hospital Culture: Top-down and Bottom-up Strategies” [2001] Applied Ergonomics 32:61–69.
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personnel.30 Furthermore there are tools which allow staff to explore the “normal” working environment,
allowing a Safety-II approach to be used to underpin risk management. The focus on the working
environment, rather than the individual system actors, makes it much more likely that staff will feel safe
in offering information that is useful to the organisation in terms of delivering safe and effective practice,
including appropriate disclosure, making it less likely that legal action will be seen as a reasonable route
to take.
30H. Vosper, S. Hignett and P. Bowie, “Twelve tips for embedding Human Factors and Ergonomics principles in healthcare education” [2017]
Medical Teacher at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0142159X.2017.1387240 [accessed 17 January 2018].
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